

## Diversion of fire and field strategy


N. Lygeros

Translated from Greek by Paola Vagioni


We rarely examine the results of the Lausanne Treaty via geostrategy and even more rarely via topostrategy. We have the tendency to emphasize on Smyrna due to strategy and on Constantinople, Imvros and Tenedos due to the exceptions of the exchange. Without this meaning of course that we are focusing on human rights, as it is confirmed by the effectiveness of our approach regarding the Pontian genocide. In reality, we operate emotionally because of the strain which these events cause to us. In consequence, the Lausanne Treaty is presented and explained statically and passively. Let us therefore introduce a topostrategic approach in order to understand, not any more our pain which is given, but the strategy that the Ottoman Empire, the Neo-Turks and Kemal followed since their framework was another one. The reconstruction of the Turkish core was the beginning due to the easy/effortless capability of controlling the center. Since the center, even if it offers many attack options, it cannot be easily managed defensively and this is because of the action symmetry.



The next stage is the lateral points that result from the so-called natural boundaries which are then transformed into strategic borders.



Disembarkation is an offensive signal, which means that the equilibrium of the point does not have the capacity of robustness. In other words, there is no strong field framework. The completion of the second stage has as a result the creation of a solid mass. The last consideration concerns the external angles. The power of the angle comes from the definition field. As an offensive tool, it is more powerful externally.



The translation of these mental schemata of topostrategy inside the geostrategy field, is expressed as follows:

$$\Lambda-A \gg \Lambda \sim \Lambda-K-I-T \sim \Lambda-I-T$$

In other words, the actual strategic target of the Smyrna destruction, was the invasion and

occupation of Eastern Thrace. In consequence, those who assume that their target was the Great Idea, will have to wait for the appearance of the Thracian problem in order to finally understand the importance of Thrace on a topostrategic level.