On the geostrategic redeployment of Russia

N. Lygeros

Contrary to appearances, Russia is in constant evolution. As one would expect, it is being reformed on the basis of its soviet background but not only this. It was obliged to compose according to a reality which no longer corresponds to its objectives. It has now surpassed this phase during which the objectives themselves represented a reality, a reality which was never realized but only conceived. Russia is reconsidering its relations and its dependencies. It is being structured not only to fill gaps, as certain analysts insist on thinking. It redefines a hierarchy of values in a context which no longer obeys doctrinal principles. At the geostrategic level, it pursues stability by adopting a moderate tone, for it makes no sense to impose it from above. In reality, the geostrategic redeployment mainly consists of a penetration of the former soviet republics, some of whose strategic data render them easy targets. This is, however, a general characteristic. Consequently, they are located in the intersection of numerous zones of influence. Furthermore, the boundaries of the basins of attraction are virtually much more complex than previously. The penetration consists of supporting an oriented rupture. But, the core of the action group is not yet centralized enough to confront the attacks being developed in the interface. Because of the revival of the religions, the reformation of the core which seems to have lost its former universality, although this is only apparent, has become indispensable. Therefore, the geostrategic redeployment cannot be a symmetrical one. On the one hand, it is adapting and on the other it is exploiting the differentiality. The old sphere of influence has been transformed into a penetration network which does not hesitate to push forward the soviet background in order to establish a new form of syncretism and naturally, this is causing certain oppositions. Nevertheless, one must admit that despite the collapse of materialism, the dialectical aspect still remains strong. Without really speaking of a doctrine, Russia puts forward a geostrategic dogma, which on the one hand is based on the military equipment and especially on the cognitive impact produced thereby, hence the facility in which the efficiency of the S-400 has been achieved, and on the other it is based on the dangers of the outside world. Therefore, the dogma is all about a dual use of the assurance procedure that creates relatively usual tactical movements on behalf of the former soviet republics. Additionally, in the context of the rupture of the hard structure, the Russian dogma is taking advantage to reorganize itself in a more flexible and powerful way so that the penetration network is transformed into a proteiform entity in such a way so as to absorb the local shock effects of the interface. Thus in the context of the autodetermination of the people, Russia plays a role by far more delicate than before enabling it to act in order to obtain corresponding results. The geostrategic redeployment of Russia is no longer content with tactical manoeuvres. The strategy applied, although apparently less aggressive, is evolving and gradually attains an indisputable efficiency, because this time the technical innovations are accompanied by an approach where grand strategy is the dominant feature.

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