We are in Washington July 29, 1974 and we are reading the Memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, which was sent to the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger.

The subject, latest Soviet Note on Cyprus and also Talk with Vorontsov.

He started with Vorontsov, so the Counselor had a call with Mr. Vorontsovin the morning. The important thing is that he mentions the United Nations Security Council, I mean the action. So Vorontsov, the Soviet guy said that “…it was a good thing for people to work around-the-clock because the situation has to brought under control.” “We are also in Geneva night and day”, was the answer. They just said that they wanted to keep in touch and by the way Vorontsov said,” don’t disappear.”  It’s seems like a joke but remember that if it is mentioned in the Memorandum, it is to say something. And I mean it’s obvious that it’s important. So, “…the Soviets are working with Makarios in New York”, so this is a mention, remember, so we have a proof “ and Rossides is also in close touch with them”, so this is a proof. We are in July 29 and there is a mention about the work between the Soviets and Makarios, so now you don’t need to believe me. “Their only real program seems to be to keep Makarios in play and to somehow get him into the diplomatic process in Geneva”. As you remember Makarios was not in Geneva, of course, but they want for him to play a role. So you see that they don’t care about the invasion, this is known and we have another poof just after the mention of the Resolution 353, “…they continue to be ambiguous as regards the Turks.” And for me another important point is the following: “Apparently, there has been some direct Soviet-Turkish contact”. This is another important point, so you see that Makarios is in contact with the Soviets in New York we have also the mention of Rossides and the Counselor thinks, at least, that there is a contact between Soviets and Turks, “…one was a meeting between the Soviet Ambassador and the Turkish Defense Minister ” so, he mentions this to say that at least this meeting was done, but we don’t know exactly what they want. Except of course, this is mentioned as “a truism that the longer the present situation continues the more entree the Soviets will acquire.” So it is for the Soviets a big interest to have the continuation of the invasion that is why they do not mention anything about it even in the letter of Brezhnev to Nixon.

The next point which is mentioned “…we are doing and the Soviets obviously know we are doing.” So, both of them are doing many things in this diplomatic game. They don’t know exactly but the position of the Americans is that “So far in New York, the British have carried the load of argument against the Soviet position”. What does it mean? It means that in fact the British proposition, which was clear, was an argument against the Soviet position. You remember the Soviet position was ‘we need Makarios again, one point and in fact no Greeks in the island. For the British the point is rather different and of course for the Americans it’s totally different. So he just said that there is British position under pressure because they carried the load of the argument against the Soviet position and you see something which is in italics “I still see no value in sending a written communication to the Soviets” so he prefers to have no written communication and just react orally. Next point there is a lie to the Greeks, see the mention “The Soviets told the Greeks that the dispatch of their observer to Geneva was the result of agreement between us; we have of course denied this but any written communication suggesting US-Soviet cooperation would undermine our position with the Greeks and Turks and imply US-Soviet collusion.” So you see there is a double game, U.S.-Soviet Union, Greeks-Turks and they don’t want to show at that point that there is a collaboration, in fact it’s not exactly a collaboration because there is no collusion, of course. It’s just an antagonism of the situation because we have a totally different position. That’s why this fact was mentioned. “In summary, therefore, if you agree”, ‘If you agree’ is a reference to Kissinger, “I think I should call Vorontsov… the end of today…” to say what, three points, of course many others are mentioned but I think these 3 points are more important “—That of course the interests of the Cypriots are not being ignored” it’s one point, in any case it’s related to the position of the Soviets. The second point is “we don’t like the accusatory tone of Soviet statements and communications” and the explanation is “they imply an adversary position when our entire purpose has been to find a solution acceptable to all directly concerned without making this an international dispute”. So, the U.S. are trying what, to avoid an international dispute and to say ok we are trying to find a solution which is acceptable. Of course, the problem is the ceasefire, remember but the Soviets have always an accusatory tone in their statements in their communications the Counsellor wants to at least mention this and said we should say this, we don’t like this. You see it’s not totally diplomatic, but it means something. The third point is “—That we continue to hope the Soviets will desist from anything that might inflame the situation”. The explanation, they are trying to avoid direct contact between the Soviets and the Turks on the ground, not in New York, because it was done. Maybe something about the boats, the fleet there, to avoid maybe between Attila I and Atilla II something, we don’t know, we are just in July 29 but in any case he said “adversely affect the already difficult climate in which the parties are attempting to work out a solution.” So you see that the American position is: we are trying to find something, we are trying to play together to obtain an acceptable solution and for the Soviets the game is different and it was mentioned at the  beginning of the Memorandum that “…the longer the present situation continues the more entree the Soviets will acquire.”

So, it’s a benefit for the Soviets to keep the invasion at the same level. For us as we are WITH US, it’s a problem. It’s a very serious problem and it’s important to know that it was known by not only of course the Counselor but also the Secretary of State Mr. Kissinger.