Cyprus introduced its EEZ back in 2004, and proceeded with three demarcations, in 2003, 2007 and 2010 successively, in accordrance with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel, whereas in Greece, there are still people who believe that in order for us to establish our EEZ, we should obtain the ability to support such an action.
The question is quite simple.
According to that manner of thinking, does Cyprus, with its occupied territories, its missing people, with its enclaved and its refugees, obtain the ability to support it?
And the answer is simple: much less than Greece if anything.
Yet again, Cyprus managed to obtain a contract with Noble, Avner and Delek regarding marine plot 12, with Eni and Kogas regarding marine plots 2, 3 and 9, and with Total in regards to 10 and 11, during the first and second licensing rounds.
Thereafter, the Aphrodite reserve proved to be marketable in 2015.
And in 2016 Cyprus obtains updated research contracts with Eni and Kogas regarding marine plots 2, 3 and 9, and with Total re: marine plot 10.
In 2016 it opened its third licensing round re: 2, 6 and 10, due to the influence associated with the discovery of the hypergigantic Zohr reserve.
In other words, Cyprus not only didn’t remain in an inaction phase, but quite the contrary, it makes the most of its EEZ, without of course been able to militarily support it, because quite simply it doesn’t need to do so, as the platforms function independently of all these.
All the excuses we hear regarding the delaying of the establishment of the Greek EEZ, are not only unsubstantial, but politely putting it unacceptable, because they purposely degenerate the data in order for those responsible to hide behind their fears and their incompetence.
The example set by Tassos Papadopoulos is simple and tangible.
Those who don’t want to follow it, it’s simply because they haven’t got the guts, and as a result hide behind institutional excuses, even though we can all see their inaction.