The achievement of an objective does not necessarily only belong to a single framework. Even more when the objective is complicated, the method should not be unilateral at the cognitive level. Each border side should be used to solve the specific problem irrespective of whether its contribution is not directly seen at a superficial level. As much as this method may be applied in active terms, it can be interpreted in passive terms as well. Namely, even in cases where we have not the initiative when receiving the attack, we can use the internal flaws of an opposite policy. Because only with a properly use of the dysfunctional details, we are able at a later stage to deploy an organized and strong counterattack in a geostrategic problematic.

The consequence of a predominant political system is a necessary multiplication of its objectives. The enlargement of the figurative battle field makes the scattering of forces and enhancement of communication media necessary. And the diffusion of a doctrine cannot happen without a local support. Thus, the development of a common objective creates a sum of small objectives which is not necessarily well-structured as it is in a group. The massification of the goal itself has local consequences that can easily be transformed into reference points of a well-targeted counterattack.

From a strategic point of view, not engaging in a battle is sometimes a victory by itself. Because the battle field remains mental only and has no practical negative repercussions. One of the best-known strategies following this system is deterrence. In this case though, where the initiative belongs to the other one, we have to adopt a powerful system of insulation, which allows a positive isolation. One of these systems is the multiple and independent contacts which force the other one to spend on reinforcement of one’s attack and is time consuming. Because a long-term attack is always beneficial to the defensive.

However, creating multiple contacts is feasible with the awareness of the overall situation. Knowledge of powers should also be multilateral, because a battle always belongs to a war. Every strategic element lives in a polemological context. Even the global knowledge is nothing but the timespan of locating a new objective. To find the local elements of a counterattack, we have to analyze the attack holistically and accurately.

The effective application of this method is feasible only if there is an a priori strategic thought able to predict future moves of the opponent. Rarely, however, does a system that could be politic, diplomatic, or strategic use its valuable time to effectively and decisively decide on this need. The system lives in a reflective everyday life. It tries to respond to each question; whereas, to indeed reply to each question one should predict the questions and not the answers.

Perhaps attack is the best defense. But what is the best attack? Strategy should reply to this question. This is the objective of this article. Uncertainty of international situation may cause confusion in the thinking of our citizens, not however in the thinking of those of them that consider that the best attack, mainly when geostrategic data are critical, remains the counterattack.