Our persistence to solve all our problems with Turkey, in order to determine afterwards the borders of the Greek E.E.Z., is not only non-efficient but also dangerous over time. Casus belli, the 12 nautical miles and the problem of the shelf are nothing but details in relation to the general E.E.Z. framework. Our strategy acquires a simplistic character, like the agreements of Cyprus with Egypt and Lebanon demonstrated. Our objective is not to focus on Turkey and specifically in an exclusive way. Otherwise the delays and the lateral attacks in the negotiations area, do not only give ideas to the other players of game theory, but they create precedents at least on the de facto level. We have the example of Gavdos with Libya. In reality, the determination of the Greek E.E.Z. has no reason to begin with Turkey. We think that the first step has to be made with Italy, which is the only country that borders with us and belongs to the European Union, without problems with Turkey and with which we have already signed an agreement as far as the F.I.R. is concerned. The next step will have to be made with Albania and in a fair manner. The third step concerns Libya and the solving of the problem with Gavdos. The fourth step has to be made with Cyprus in order to reinforce to entire framework of the Single Defense Doctrine. Only the fifth step will concern Turkey. Thus this final negotiation, which will be taking place on a European framework, will not be on a primary level since all the other agreements on both European and Euro-Mediterranean levels will have been preceded. The E.E.Z. issue is not only a problem but an entire questioning which our country must necessarily have if it wants to incorporate the new data which determine the world scene. This signifies that it is meaningless to wait for the constitution of a committee with special jurisdictions as far as the E.E.Z. is concerned. In reality, the E.E.Z. has to be included as a factor in our mental strategy. It is neither an exception nor a special case. It belongs to the facts of our geostrategy via topostrategy. In consequence, it is our responsibility to pass the message to the entire politic-diplomatic-military level, if we really want to have performance in national issues. Unless we say that we concern ourselves with them, without actually believing that we can solve them. The issue of the E.E.Z. clarifies many problems that practically appear only in big distances. The picture of the Aegean with the 6 nautical miles that we have, has nothing to do with the following reality. Let us enrich our data and let us highlight the mental schemata which will be able to endure the changes without undergoing degenerations.