In this podcast we are talking about the year 1964. More precisely we are reading the Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, we are in Washington, May 10th, 1964

The telegram has 13 points. Let’s consider the first one. We are talking in fact about the Finnish Mediator: Proceeding from the Constitution of 1960, he is considering proposals that would give the Greek Cypriots more in the way of majority rule. In order to assure the Turk Cypriots of their rights and security, he is toying with the idea of a) a quasi-federal system under which five or six areas with predominant Turkish populations would have a certain autonomy in communal affairs and b) a long-term UN observer and international participation in or supervision of the court system.

But we think that the 5^th point is even more interesting.

The Soviet Government would presumably seek to play a double game of supporting Makarios while at the same time exploiting the growing disenchantment of the Turks. What the Soviet Union is most afraid of is “enosis” which could lead to the presence of NATO in Cyprus.

So it’s very interesting in fact to understand that the position of the Soviets is to relate the idea of enosis to the presence of NATO in Cyprus. This point is again present at point 10 of the telegram in a quite different manner.

Let’s see it.

From Papandreou’s talk with Fulbright and from other sources there are indications of an increasing Greek Government disenchantment with Makarios. I find Papandreou’s repeated references to “enosis” a healthy sign. From the point of view of all of NATO, we should regard “enosis” as a useful component in any final solution since it would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the Island rather than the wolf in priest’s clothing.

This point is important for the following reason. We see that the point of Soviets is clearly against enosis, the point of the Americans is with this concept. So the difference is that in fact even Papandreou at that time was closer to this notion of enosis than Makarios and for NATO all the members should, in fact at that time, see it as a useful component in the solution for the Cyprus issue and this means that they prefer this option than any other. It’s not so known as a position so it’s clearly this Telegram from at that time is useful for the history.