74682 - Transcription of Podcast #19: Analysis of Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and British Foreign Secretary Callaghan July 17, 1974, 2:50 p.m.

Ν. Λυγερός

K: Can you hear me?

C: “I think so”, he answered “I think if about seventeen people get off the line I could hear you better.

So, imagine, we are at the White House, we are between U.S. and U.K.

K: “I was thinking of sending Joe or Bob to London” you remember so it was exactly the previous minutes

Some precision from Callaghan “Makarios is leaving at 11:00 our time and will be with you at 1:35. He will then ask for a Security Council meeting on Friday.

Remember, it’s important, Security Council.

K: “Right.”

C: “So that gives you time.

Not so much.

K: “I will try to get someone over tomorrow morning and then have him go to Athens and Ankara.

So again,

C: “ I’ll tell you our position and this is basically the European position

 

Remember what the European position is, it’s all the countries in the Nine. The Nine at that time was the European Union. We are in 1974, so after ’73, which means that United Kingdom, Ireland and also Denmark are in the European pool. We are before ’81 so before Greece, so there are Nine just to remember because for you because are young you cannot imagine what Nine is, so now you know. And also for our friends.

This is the position of the Nine and NATO C: “We think the ideal solution would be to get Makarios back…Makarios asked for diplomatic activity to continue and the need for non-recognition of the new regime in Cyprus.

This point is clear. The remark of Kissinger is “Some of our people are wondering if a compromise not be Clerides.”

So, in fact, the equilibrium, not Sampson, not Makarios but Clerides.

C: “He couldn’t hold itBut the compromise might be an election in 3 months with Makarios back on the Island. ”

Remember he will go back in December.

K: “But how will you get him back? ”

So you see the problem, C: “Well, hopefully you would exert your influence on the Greek Government about the national guard officers. The Turks under our guarantee Treaty may say to us what are you going to do and if action doesn’t seem possible—any of the three powers has the right to take action.

Remember this is the Treaty and they are going to use it.

C: “I think we can take it that we can talk about unilateral action

So, this is very precise. “…and if so then there has to be US pressure on Greece. and if so then there has to be US pressure on Greece.

Because in fact it is the same problem with the coup.

Kissinger says: “I see it similarly. But I am not sure about what we are embarking on when you say diplomatic action. ”

So, you see even between U.S. and U.K. the situation about the behavior at the strategic level how to solve the problem is not clear.

So Callaghan says, “But, if you think six months ahead, my view is that it is better to have Makarios there than Sampson

K: “That is almost certainly true, I agree.” In six months, so, remember in July six months… December. Again, the problem with the Soviets, the remark is from Kissinger,

K: “…, we want to avoid giving the Soviets an excuse to make what happens legitimate.

C: “Yes. Again, looking six months ahead of Sampson”. You see, he will stay only a few days but in their minds it’s possible to be more, but they don’t know anything about that.

C: “If Sampson stays, he would be accused of running a Fascist regime and the Russians are stepping up their activity so I come back again to—we may not succeed but it could be that we may crack the regime and get Sampson to withdraw. ”

K: “Let me get somebody over to talk to you. We agree on the general approach. We are not too far apart on it. ”

Remember that it’s before so, some mentions about Sisco and Ingersoll after that. Just a remark before we end this analysis. You see the remark of Callaghan,

C: “I didn’t know it til lunch and the House of Commons is anti-Greek on both sides”, in Britain, because you remember Callaghan is a British guy so, it’s clear that it was new also for him and you see the end again,

C: “…If anything comes out of the meeting with the Turks, I will give you a call. We have had a request—that if they… get out of us, they might act unilaterally.”

In fact, the British are aware that it’s a possibility. He informs Kissinger.

K: “You can tell them we are willing to exert ourselves with the Greek Government but I want to get our strategy more precise and also that we are not supporting Sampson.

It cannot be more clear. S they are not related, they are not supporting him and this a proof.