When the players don’t play rationally, the theory of games collapses, because they don’t allow its function, the prerequisites. So if we want to analyze the war in Syria or even the conflict in Korea, it is preferable to examine power games. In this situation we don’t have a zero sum but neither a framework of cooperation. Initially the players show their dogma which is the only obvious element of their strategy if of course they have one and they try then through the potential to influence the other. In this power game we are dealing with players which may be rational but do not always have a rational behavior. This means that they seek to move out the predictable framework and may bring out also ploys that are not stratagems but in a short period of time they can provoke turmoil to the opposition, as it occurs with blitz in chess. They will also engage in systems we see in poker, but in both situations we have strong computer models who tolerate the non-rational. The issue is theoretically as simple as potential but the involvement of reality changes the data and the easy scenarios collapse quicker. The non rational creates many mistakes and the robustness must be reinforced. So the change of phase comes with a difference with regards to management and the hits must be short and strong to transform the initiative to an advantage of action.